

Trade-offs between climate action and poverty reduction



South African climate policy, the SDG and the implementation of the Paris Agreement

South Africa's climate emergency

39% of the population live with
less than 40 EUR per month

95% Coal fired
Electricity

9,1 per capita emissions
~ 1% of global emissions

Inequality GINI 0,7




FFS sustaining
Energy intensive
industries

Unemployment 25%




0 Poverty

Paris Goal < 1,5 C

Climate neutrality by
2050



and



GS fotografie

Climate governance



International
climate governance

Paris Agreement on Climate Change & SDG

Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC)

Implementation of the PA

Domestic climate
policy arenas

National climate & development policies

- Adaptation related policies
- Clean energy policies
- Carbon pricing mechanisms
- National Development Planning
- Transport policies
- Energy access
-

Power,
coalition &
political risk

Communities and
households

Inequality and redistribution

Climate governance



International climate governance

Paris Agreement on Climate Change

Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC)

Domestic climate policy arenas

National Climate Change Response White Paper
Carbon Tax
RE program
Rural livelihoods
Education

Anti Corruption

National climate policies

- Adaptation related policies
- (Clean) energy policies
- Carbon pricing mechanisms
- National Development Planning
- Transport policies

Etc.

Implementation of the PA

Power, coalition & political risk

Communities and households

Inequality and redistribution




Research question



How can societies in developing nations manage to reduce emissions and poverty simultaneously?

How do political actors perceive Trade-offs between poverty Reduction and climate change Mitigation?



Known drivers and constraints to institutional change




- i. external and internal events and dynamics in the political economy (Thelen and Hall 2009),
- ii. the nature of conflicts and power relations (Knight 1992, Streeck and Thelen, 2005, pp. 15–16),
- iii. the relative power of various actors to organize coalitions to defend or change existing institutional arrangements (Hall 2009)
- iv. the coalitions' ability to dominate a political process (Leifeld, Haunss 2011).

GAP: evidence on institutional change from developing countries

Merging of formal and informal institutions, in neopatrimonialist political system, high insecurity, leads to intransparent policy outcomes

Analytical framework

Analytical framework:
Actors and factors for institutional change



Incremental: displacement, layering, drift, conversion, innovation
Radical: revolution

Research design






Fig. 1. Model of a discourse network.
Source: own.

Discourse networks:
Comparative Analysis of three
principal climate policies in South Africa


Discourse network on the South African carbon tax



SA's National Climate Response White Paper



SA's Renewable Energy Program



Findings

Factors	NCCR	Carbon tax	Renewable Energy
External and internal events and dynamics in the political economy	Strong influence of COP 17	Strong influence of COP 17, environmental taxing under way	Strong influence of COP 17, announcement of SARI
Nature of conflicts and power relations	Distributive conflicts, unclear in implementation	Distributive conflicts, very specifically targeted	Limited losses and perceived distributive conflicts, clear benefits for large coalition of support
Relative power of various actors	Strong lobby against carbon budgets, weak institutional grounds for implementation	Strong business lobby against the tax, powerful government actors, small coalition of support	Large coalition of support in the energy sector, government, international actors, financial sectors
Coalitions' ability to dominate a political process	Uneven power relations play in favor of opposition	Eskom passing on the tax, increase of electricity tariffs	Positive overall impacts, but local side fights

Conclusions



- Institutional change depends on the nature of the coalitions in opposition and support of the intervention
- Institutional change mostly layering, no radical change
- Implementation depends on the structure of the coalitions in support or opposition
- Support or opposition depends on the distributional conflicts
- Trade-offs between climate and poverty appear in the discourse mainly in the carbon tax

Conclusions



- most contested climate policies are those that create distributional conflicts where powerful, non-poor actors will potentially experience real losses to their fossil fuel- based operations.
- This finding opposes the assumption of competing objectives between emissions and poverty reduction.
- Yet, actors use discourse that relates to potentially competing objectives between emissions reductions, jobs, poverty reduction and economic welfare.

Outlook



- SA's commitment to the Paris Goal in the NDC
- Debate whether to update the NDC
- Carbon tax levels comparatively low
- IRP makes strong case for RE, but allows for new coal

Many thanks for your attention

- Rennkamp, Britta (2019) : Power, coalitions and institutional change in South African climate policy, *Climate Policy*, pages 756-770.
- Rennkamp, Britta (2019): The role of NDCs in fulfilling energy related SDGs in Sub-Saharan Africa, Policy Brief, CUTS International.