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THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN SOUTH AFRICA

A SOCIAL SPACE PERSPECTIVE

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The socio-economic dimensions of racial inequality in South Africa: a social space perspective.

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ABSTRACT

It is well evidenced that South Africa is characterised by extreme economic inequality. To complement the extensive body of work on the dynamics of vulnerability and poverty alleviation, this study aims to 'turn the telescope' (Savage 2021), using a sociological lens, onto the structuring of privilege in South Africa. The analysis we present is a first attempt to systematically map how stocks of economic, cultural, and social capital intersect to generate systematic and structural inequalities in the country, and to consider how far these are associated with fundamental racial divides. To achieve this, we utilise rich, nationally representative data from the National Income Dynamics Study and employ Geometric Data Analysis and Multiple Correspondence Analysis to construct a model of South African 'social space'.

Our findings reveal distinct features of South African social space. Firstly, the inheritor class reveals the intensely strong interplay between inequalities of economic and cultural capital. Secondly, there is some evidence that this homogeneity is associated with an enduring racialized divide. Thirdly, the size of the upwardly mobile class indicates that forms of middle-class privilege percolate well beyond a core of the 8% of the population that is white, suggesting fluidity and change in the South African social space. Finally, social capital is strongly delineated by age, with older respondents displaying on average higher levels of trust. Our cluster analysis reveals that trust levels increase with economic and cultural capital levels within younger age groups and could therefore entrench social and racial divisions.

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1. Introduction

By numerous economic metrics, South Africa is the most unequal nation in the world. Yet, although there is extensive research on its dynamics of poverty and vulnerability, the structural analysis of privilege remains largely uncharted territory. Reflecting the dominance of economic analysis, studies remain preoccupied by the extent and prospects for mobility across the poverty threshold. Although there is now a substantial discussion about the significance of the middle, and to a lesser extent, upper class, the definition of these groups is largely characterised in negative terms – by the fact that they are not in poverty (in some versions, not at significant risk of falling into poverty) – with the implications being that their lifestyles are characterised by freedom from scarcity. Although this approach is entirely understandable, we start from the recognition that the institutionalisation of wealth and privilege is also strongly marked, reflecting the long experience of colonialism and the apartheid regime. Since this period, the rise of economic inequality in South Africa, along with its profile as one of Africa's most powerful nations, has made the analysis of its wealth and privilege a matter for critical reflection and analysis.

There is considerable debate about how economic, social, and cultural privilege in South Africa may continue to be racialised. This is an area where purely economic analysis offers only limited purchase, and where sociological research is vital. Although Southall's (2018: 467) observation that 'development economists are accused by radical scholars of exhibiting an almost total lack of grounding in social theory alongside a dubious empiricism', it remains true that the sociological critique is empirically underdeveloped, relying either on a restatement of theoretical fiat (often some kind of political economy perspective, as ultimately with Southall 2018), or by extrapolating from (often outstanding) qualitative research grounded in specific localities. A fascinating, though also singular, example is Alexander et al.'s (2013) study of Soweto which demonstrates the very subtle class boundaries which are evoked by racialised communities. It is necessary to scale up from such studies to consider more systematically the organisation of 'capitals, assets, and resources' (Savage et al. 2005), including possible tensions and divisions within privileged middle-class and elite groups. Economic analysis also tends to prioritise economic distributions rather than the categorical divides that sociologists address (see in general, Diaz Pabon et al. 2021).

In this paper, we make a fundamental contribution to the structural analysis of privilege in South Africa by drawing on the unusually rich National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS). We break new ground by using Geometric Data Analysis (GDA), and specifically, Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA) (Le Roux and Rouanet, 2004, 2010, Hjellbrekke 2018) in our analysis. GDA differs from conventional multivariate techniques which distinguish *a priori* dependent variables which might then be explained through different combinations of independent variables; instead, it proceeds inductively from an Individuals x Variables table. For MCA, variables are categorized or composed of modalities; the geometric approach leads to two 'clouds' of points, namely the 'cloud of individuals' and the 'cloud of modalities', whose principal axes are sought and interpreted using MCA.

This method has been increasingly used in European nations to examine how different forms of capital and resources are organised (e.g. Le Roux et al. 2008; Flemmen et al. 2018). To date, MCA has rarely been used outside of the global north. We use this method to construct a model of the South African 'social space'. Since MCA makes no *a priori* assumptions about the oppositions between the different variables used to construct its models of social space, it is therefore a sensitive tool that can avoid and even interrogate Eurocentric assumptions or models. Here, for instance, it offers a powerful contrast to (for instance) occupational models of social class which have been tested in the global north and then extended to other nations, without due cognisance of the fact that the very different economic order of these nations may question the validity of such models.

We begin by reflecting on the case of inequality in South Africa as one bearing huge strategic interest because of its multiple confluence of inequality drivers. Secondly, we discuss our data source, including its main contribution to the analysis of inequality to date. Thirdly, we introduce MCA and explain how we construct our model of social space, before moving to describe the two most powerful axes that our study reveals. The final part of our paper reflects on the five clusters derived from the MCA analysis. These clusters reveal four key findings. Firstly, the inheritor class reveals the intensely strong interplay between inequalities of economic and cultural capital. Secondly, there is some evidence that this homogeneity is associated with an enduring racialized divide. Thirdly, the size of the upwardly mobile class indicates that forms of middle-class privilege percolate well beyond a core of the 8% of the population that is white, suggesting that the social space in South Africa is changing. Finally, social capital is strongly delineated by age, with older respondents displaying on average higher levels of trust. Our cluster analysis reveals that trust levels increase with economic and cultural capital levels within younger age groups and could therefore entrench social and racial divisions.

2. Race and the structuring of privilege and inequality

Our aim is to complement the extensive literature analysing poverty dynamics and poverty alleviation by 'turning the telescope', using a sociological lens, onto the structuring of privilege (see Savage 2021). Necessarily, we situate our discussion from a recognition of South Africa's brutal colonial experience and its ongoing imprint in contemporary society. Apartheid institutionalised racial divisions in notoriously vicious forms and inscribed them into the organisation of wealth, property, and privilege itself. The labour market was fundamentally stratified along racial lines. Black people were prevented from living in 'white' areas, except by formal permit, with the majority relegated to rural peripheries. Those who were permitted into 'white' areas under the hated pass laws, were concentrated in informal settlements where acquisition of property wealth was largely impossible and only a very small minority were permitted to acquire owner occupied property.

Since the end of apartheid in 1994, the ANC government has, ostensibly at least, sought to address racial divisions through multiple recon-

struction, development, and redistributive policies (e.g. the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP)). As Levy et al. (2014) note, redistribution was largely directed at extending services to the poor, rather than addressing social inequality more structurally. Similarly, social expenditures were expanded and restructured to be progressively targeted. By the late 1990s policies were in place to target discrimination. All of these held out the promise of addressing racial economic divides and were buttressed by the unusual range of active civil society and campaigning groups, which offered the potential for building social capital and politicising racial inequalities.

However, other than the roll-out of RDP houses, very little was done in terms of direct asset or wealth redistribution and, given sluggish growth and employment, it is not surprising that inequality has actually become more, and not less, entrenched. Indeed the situation has deteriorated markedly, and statistics characteristically place South Africa as the most unequal nation in the world, having overtaken Brazil during the 2000s. Figure 1 provides further support for this argument, using the World Inequality Database (WID) and focusing on the share of total income taken by the top 10% of the population. The top 10% share rose rapidly from the end of apartheid in 1994 until 2012, faster than any other major nation apart from India.

Figure 1: Top 10% National Income Share



Source: www.wid.world

When attention is paid to the 1% of earners who became the focus of economic attention following the lead of Piketty and Saez (2003), the evolving South African situation is less clear (Figure 2). By 2021 South Africa is not the outlier that it is when the top 10% of earners are the focus. It is the top 10% group that stands out from the rest of the South African population most starkly compared to other nations. That said, as reflected in the dotted lines in Figures 1 and 2, relevant South African data are scarce in WID for more recent periods and there is a need to look for corroborating evidence elsewhere.

Figure 2: Top 1% National Income Share



Source: www.wid.world

This suggestion that South African inequality is not simply driven by a small elite but stretches down into wider mechanisms of privilege amongst the upper middle classes is backed up by Bassier and Woolard (2018). Using tax data and survey data, their central finding is that the gap between a stagnant middle and the top end of the income distribution widened between 2003 and 2017.

Economic data from WID cannot provide the requisite information on racialised economic divisions since the taxation data on which they rely does not include any measure of ethnic or racial background. We do know, from other evidence, that the racialisation of economic divisions is very strong. Leibbrandt et al. (2010) decompose income inequality along racial categories to analyse intra-group and between group inequalities for 1993–2008. For 1993, they show an astonishing contribution of between group inequality of 42% and 50%, depending on whether racial population shares or income shares are used to weight inequality. By 2008, the inequality between different groups had declined slightly, to 30% and 38%, respectively. Hino et al. (2018) and Statistics South Africa (2019) both suggest a further decline by 2015. Nonetheless, the disparities remain remarkably high.

These racialised differences in total income are mirrored in labour market outcomes, which is unsurprising given that employment and earnings represent the key drivers of overall income inequality.[5] These racialised differences are reflected in both employment rates, as well as in the wages earned amongst those who are employed. The unemployment rate for Black[6] individuals in-

5 A recent Statistics South Africa Inequality Trends Report found that 74% of overall income inequality in 2015 could be attributed to labour market inequality (Statistics South Africa 2019).

6 Black African.

creased from 28.6% to 31% between 2011 and 2017, while the corresponding statistics for White South Africans were much lower, 5.8% and 6.7%, respectively (Statistics South Africa 2019).

These extreme income inequalities may also be compounded by wealth dynamics. The South African income Gini coefficient is around 0.67, while for wealth it is at least 0.9–0.95. This stark wealth inequality is consistently found by those using NIDS survey data (Mbewe and Woolard 2016), tax data (Chatterjee et al. 2022), and survey and tax data combined (Orthofer 2016). For example, using the second wave of NIDS (2010-2011) Mbewe and Woolard (2016) find that, in relative terms, Black households only hold about 1 % of the wealth held by White households. The figures in Coloured and Asian/Indian households are 12% and 63%, respectively.

It is clear that economic inequality is extreme, and although there is prima facie evidence that this is associated with fundamental, entrenched racial divides, this needs further investigation. Importantly, 'turning the telescope' (Savage 2021) to examine this structuring of privilege involves more than the analysis of income and wealth inequalities. Following Bourdieu, it also involves the analysis of cultural and social capital, recognising that the mobilisation of these resources also involves the deployment of forms of privilege.

Cultural and social capital inequalities

An original part of our sociological contribution, following Bourdieu's lead, is to include cultural and social dimensions of inequality, and to link these to the economic aspects which we have shown to be incredibly highly inscribed above. Cultural and social divides are also intense in South Africa. South Africa has very high returns to post-secondary education, even by global standards, and these have increased over time. Higher education is increasingly important in the link between inequalities in economic and cultural capital accumulation. As with income, the quality of education provision is distributed unequally in South Africa, and is strongly stratified by race, geographical location, and income (Branson and Lam 2021).

Under apartheid, different education systems existed for each race group. Education for the Black population was purposefully inferior to that of the White population in terms of years of compulsory schooling, curriculum, resources, and teacher qualifications. While educational attainment increased rapidly for cohorts born between the 1950s and 1980s, and the racial gap decreased from seven to two years, disparities in educational outcomes remain stark.

Low levels of post-school enrolment reflect limited, and unequal, levels of learning in primary and secondary schools (Branson and Lam 2021).[7] Figure 3 shows that the proportion of Black secondary school graduates who complete a post-secondary qualification has declined steeply across birth cohorts, widening the racial gap in post-secondary attainment for younger cohorts of secondary school graduates. Although this coincides with a growth in the share of Black students completing secondary education, Figure 4 shows that since the end of apartheid, White South Africans' attainment levels in post-school

7 In South Africa, post-schooling comprises any education that takes place after compulsory schooling. Compulsory schooling occurs from the year in which a child turns seven until Grade 9 or the age of fifteen, whichever occurs first (South African Schools Act, 1996).

education (47% in 2021) have been three times higher than attainment levels among Black and Coloured people. Furthermore, although all population groups have seen an increase in the post-school qualification share since 1994, the growth has been 10 and 14 percentage points within the White and Indian population group and only 5 and 7 percentage points within the Black and Coloured population groups. This pulling away is especially noteworthy given that the prior baseline levels of achievement were substantially higher amongst the White group; highlighting again the widening gap in post-school attainment between race groups.

Figure 3: Proportion completing post-secondary (of those with 12+ years of education), by year of birth and population group



Source: Replication of Branson & Lam 2021 figure; Community Survey 2016; 3-year moving averages.

With a labour market that increasingly favours those with post-secondary education, these racial gaps in education play an important part in perpetuating inequality. Performance in secondary school, which is unequal across schools, strongly determines eligibility to study further, and upward socioeconomic mobility is further limited by the fact that inequality in income as well as educational attainment among parents strongly correlates with inequality in education outcomes for the next generation (Branson and Lam 2021).

Figure 4: Qualification attainment by subgroup



Source: www.siyaphambili.uct.ac.za.

Notes: The graph reflects attainment of post-school qualifications, which include any qualifications from universities, colleges, or other post-school institutions.

In addition to the importance of education for labour market outcomes in South Africa, the economic returns to English language proficiency are large (Posel and Casale, 2011; Khan et al. 2019). Although South Africa is a multilingual society with 11 official languages, English remains a dominant language in educational, economic, and political spheres. Given this, proficiency in English is likely an important dimension of cultural capital, but as with the other forms of capital, there are large differences in English language proficiency by race group. Table 1 shows that Black and Coloured South Africans are less likely to report being proficient in English than Indian and White South Africans.

The analysis of social capital as a cause and/or consequence of cycles of (racialised) inequality in South Africa has hitherto received less prominence than economic and cultural capital. The extent to which economic, cultural, and social capital intersect to structure and perpetuate privilege requires a more nuanced analysis of social capital alongside both cultural and economic capital, but many household surveys that are strong on the social capital front (e.g. the Afrobarometer Surveys and the South African Reconciliation Barometer Surveys) are not sufficiently strong across the other two domains to analyse relationships in-depth.

Our review demonstrates how substantial inequalities straddling economic, cultural, and social dimensions exist in South Africa. We have shown that they have a powerful racialised component, which may have intensified in recent decades. We have also shown that they cannot be reduced simply to the existence of a small elite but are more widely entrenched amongst a broader upper middle-class population. These structural inequalities are persistent, and there is evidence that they may reinforce each other, as with the way that racial divisions in educational attainment may also generate income inequalities. Hitherto, however, there are no studies exploring the interplay between these forms of capital, which makes our analysis here highly original.

3. Modelling a South African social space

In the remainder of this paper, we use the most recent data from NIDS, taking advantage of its rich questions on economic, social, and cultural capital to provide a composite picture of the structuring of privilege in South Africa and the extent to which it is associated with categorical divisions. In this regard, we give particular attention to race, but we will also include gender and age.

NIDS (Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit, 2017) is a longitudinal survey of individuals and their households, developed as a tool for government to track and understand the shifting face of poverty and inequality in South Africa. NIDS was designed to be nationally representative of the population in 2008, when the first wave of data was collected on a sample of over 28 000 individuals in about 7 300 households. Individuals from the baseline survey were then re-contacted every two years and interviewed along with their current household residents. Over time, attrition has affected the sample and in Wave 5 the sample was topped up to account for high attrition in high-income areas (Branson and Wittenberg, 2019).

Given that NIDS comprises such rich information on socioeconomic variables as well as dedicated sections to physical and emotional health, it has been used widely in both the economics and health fields but is yet to be maximally utilised for sociological analysis.[8] We break new ground by using Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA) to analyse 'social space' in South Africa using the NIDS data.

MCA is a form of principal components analysis which considers the number and nature of axes required to interpret the variation within complex data sets, which includes measures of economic, social and cultural capital. Here we follow a growing trend in sociological analysis (e.g. Bennett et al 2009; Alecu et al 2022; Flemmen et al 2018; Flemmen and Savage 2017) that uses MCA to construct a 'social space'. This is the first time this has been attempted for South Africa, or as far as we are aware, for any African nation, and is only possible because of the quality and multi-dimensional questioning of the NIDS survey. We underscore that we are not expecting to generate similar findings to those which have been uncovered in European nations. We have emphasised above that the distinctive history of colonialism, racism, and the recent neo-liberal economic trajectory in South Africa is likely to impart very distinctive features. Notably, we anticipate strong racialised divisions intersecting powerfully with the distribution of capital, more strongly than is evident in European nations.

Even so, in order to highlight these distinctive features of South African inequalities, we can briefly summarise common findings from European studies to identify a frame from which South African specificities can be highlighted. In European nations, on the first, most powerful axis, there is an opposition distinguishing those with and without various measures of capital. This is characteristically referred to as the 'capital volume' axis. Typically, those located at the top of this axis have high amounts of economic, cultural, and social capital, and those at the bottom have little. This separation is entirely to be expected, given the

8 Njozela and Burns (2019) use data on trust across five waves of NIDS to create a social cohesion index. Posel (2022) uses the same trust information from NIDS Wave 5 to describe racial differences in willingness to trust.

methodology itself, and in some respects is less analytically important than the second axis. In Bourdieu's (1985) famous analysis in *Distinction* this axis separated out those with economic capital ('industrialists') from those with cultural capital ('intellectuals') and was thus a central reason why he saw it as vital to distinguish economic from cultural capital.

In developing our South African social space, we used six variables on economic capital, three on cultural capital, and five on social capital (Q=14). In the active set, four variables on trust are included as proxies for social capital. Of these, three have been recoded to avoid relative frequencies <5% or to avoid destabilizing categories (see Table 1 below). The sample is restricted to respondents aged 24-85. Respondents who have not answered any of the questions on trust are also filtered out.[9] There are 17 331 active cases (N=17 331), which have been weighted so that they are representative of the global population of interest.

Table 1 provides summary information on the active variables that we used, breaking each down by their racial composition (supplementary variables used in the analysis are in Table A1 in Appendix A). For economic capital we construct income quintiles based on the full population income distribution.[10] Table 1 shows the proportion of our population of interest in each of the quintiles. The stark racial divisions are evident by the fact that less than 0.4% of White respondents fall into the lowest quintile, whereas 16% of Black and 12% of the Coloured group fall into this quintile. At the other extreme, 87% of White respondents are found in the top income quintile.

One of the strengths of NIDS is its measurement of wealth, and we included five questions tapping into these measures; (i) a variable on owner occupied housing, divided into not owner occupied, owner occupied with a state (RDP) subsidy, owner occupied, and owner occupied but market value not provided; (ii) perceptions of net worth (divided into 'having something left over', 'break even', or are 'in debt' ; (iii) financial assets (differentiated into having no wealth, and having wealth above and below the median levels)[11], (iv) owning a computer and (v) number of rooms in the household. Table 1 shows that the distribution of these assets is not as starkly divided as evident for income, and the racial divides do not seem as strong: 44% of South Africans – and 40% of Black respondents – feel they have 'something left over' in terms of their net worth; 41% (and 41% of Black individuals) live in some kind of owner occupied housing, and 42% live in houses with five rooms or more. That being said, the share in government subsidized housing (RDP owner occupancy), is 10% for Black versus 1% for White respondent, and average household size is 4.2 for Black and 2.8 for White respondents, reflecting underlying racial differences in our capital measures.

9 Adult respondents with proxy responses are thus excluded because the proxy questionnaire does not include questions on trust. A further 28 respondents did not answer any of the trust questions.

10 Weighted per capita household income is divided into five equal categories.

11 Financial assets are defined as bank account savings and having unit trusts, stocks or shares – a narrow definition of financial wealth.

Table 1: Mean of active variables by race

	All	African	Coloured	Indian/Asian	White
Quintile 1	0.14	0.16	0.12	0.02	0.003
Quintile 2	0.17	0.19	0.15	0.04	0.02
Quintile 3	0.19	0.21	0.26	0.09	0.02
Quintile 4	0.23	0.24	0.26	0.40	0.09
Quintile 5	0.27	0.20	0.21	0.45	0.87
Not living in own property	0.59	0.60	0.63	0.52	0.47
Owner occupied, RDP	0.09	0.10	0.10	0.01	0.01
Owner occupied	0.25	0.23	0.21	0.44	0.49
Owner occupied, value missing	0.07	0.08	0.06	0.03	0.03
Something left over	0.44	0.42	0.40	0.55	0.64
Break even	0.28	0.29	0.25	0.31	0.16
In debt/don't know	0.27	0.28	0.31	0.11	0.16
Missing info	0.02	0.01	0.03	0.03	0.04
Missing info	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.03
None	0.30	0.31	0.39	0.28	0.08
Financial assets <= median value	0.34	0.36	0.31	0.18	0.16
Financial assets > median value	0.36	0.32	0.29	0.53	0.73
Missing info	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01
Yes	0.16	0.11	0.15	0.23	0.64
No	0.84	0.89	0.85	0.77	0.35
1-2 rooms	0.28	0.31	0.27	0.02	0.04
3-4 rooms	0.32	0.32	0.37	0.44	0.21
5-6 rooms	0.24	0.22	0.28	0.45	0.36
7+ rooms	0.16	0.15	0.08	0.09	0.39
Don't know/missing	0.07	0.06	0.15	0.13	0.12
No schooling	0.36	0.41	0.26	0.31	0.02
Primary	0.23	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.03
Incomplete secondary	0.20	0.19	0.25	0.15	0.28
Matric	0.06	0.04	0.04	0.11	0.29
Post-school qualification	0.07	0.06	0.05	0.05	0.25
Don't know/missing	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.02
No schooling	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.01	0.00
Primary	0.14	0.15	0.19	0.14	0.00
Incomplete secondary	0.34	0.35	0.39	0.28	0.17
Matric	0.17	0.16	0.15	0.33	0.26
Post-school qualification	0.29	0.27	0.22	0.20	0.55
Missing	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01
Very well	0.56	0.53	0.50	0.83	0.84
Fair	0.21	0.21	0.25	0.11	0.11
Not well/not at all	0.24	0.26	0.25	0.06	0.04
Missing info	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.04
Not at all	0.30	0.33	0.22	0.14	0.09
Just a little	0.41	0.42	0.41	0.35	0.26
Somewhat	0.24	0.20	0.32	0.39	0.49
A lot	0.05	0.04	0.04	0.11	0.12
Missing info	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.05
Not at all	0.41	0.46	0.28	0.18	0.12
Just a little	0.35	0.35	0.38	0.30	0.28
Somewhat	0.20	0.15	0.29	0.38	0.46
A lot	0.04	0.03	0.04	0.12	0.10
Missing info	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.02
Not at all	0.10	0.11	0.06	0.03	0.03
Just a little	0.19	0.21	0.19	0.15	0.07
I trust them somewhat	0.24	0.25	0.24	0.20	0.19
I trust them a lot	0.46	0.42	0.49	0.61	0.69
Missing info	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.02
Not at all	0.20	0.22	0.15	0.12	0.04
Just a little	0.39	0.42	0.34	0.28	0.20
Somewhat	0.31	0.29	0.40	0.37	0.44
A lot	0.09	0.07	0.11	0.23	0.30
Likelihood of neighbour returning wallet with R200					
Missing	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.09	0.04
Very likely	0.13	0.11	0.13	0.10	0.29
Somewhat likely	0.22	0.22	0.15	0.33	0.28
Not likely at all	0.61	0.63	0.68	0.48	0.39
Observations[3]	17 359	13 543	2 431	316	1 067

For cultural capital we used (i) mother's education (partly as there was much less missing data than there was for father's education); (ii) respondents' own education; and (iii) self-reported proficiency at writing in English. These variables show that stocks of cultural capital as measured in NIDS are very low: 78% of South Africans report mothers with less than secondary school education, and 54% of respondents report their own education to be likewise below secondary level. Forty-five percent report being fluent in English. The racial divides are also huge, larger than for our measures of economic inequality: turning the lens to privilege, 6% of Black respondents have mothers with a post school qualification, compared to 25% of White respondents. The racial gap is even higher for own education, with 27% of Black and 55% of White respondents obtaining a post-school qualification.

It was more difficult to find appropriate questions to measure social capital, as there are no questions asking about respondents' practices with respect to friends or their social interactions in NIDS Wave 5. However, there are some questions on whether respondents trust (i) people of the same race; (ii) people of other races; (iii) relatives; and (iv) others they know (presumably people such as friends, neighbours, or acquaintances), and a question asking about the likelihood of your neighbour returning a wallet with R200. It is widely argued that social capital is bound up with trusting capabilities (notably Putnam 1995, 2000) and although these are attitude questions, because they focus on specific kinds of people who might be trusted, it is reasonable to use them for our purposes here.[12]

Table 1 reveals strikingly low levels of trust. This is especially when asked with respect to trusting people of the same and other races, though it is interesting that there is very little difference in the trust given to one's own race, and other races. It appears that simply asking about trusting on a racial axis appears to lower the propensity of respondents to claim they trust. Eighteen percent of Black respondents trust other races 'somewhat', or a lot, compared to 24% who trust someone of their own race. Seventy-six percent of respondents report that they trust other racial groups 'not at all', or 'just a little'. White respondents claim to be more trusting, with 61% reporting at least some trust for their own race, and 56% for other races. In general, there is much more trust in relatives, suggesting that solidarities mainly take place amongst kinship and family lines and that broader patterns of social capital linking less familiar or intimate ties are weak.

4. The social space

Our application of MCA to the NIDS data leads to two powerful axes summing up 72% of total variance (see Tables A2-A4 in Appendix A for details). As is common in applications of MCA from numerous national contexts, Axis 1 is a general axis, which receives contributions above the threshold from 6 out of 14 variables (highlighted cells, Table 2). It is noteworthy that variables on economic and cultural capital are both very strong: notably income quintile, and respondent's individual edu-

12 When using these variables to measure social cohesion, Njozela and Burns (2019) note that interview timing may affect reporting of perceived trust. Individuals interviewed soon after Freedom Day (27 April) report significantly lower levels of trust but significantly higher levels of perceived equality than individuals interviewed later. Conversely, individuals interviewed soon after Heritage Day (24 September) report significantly higher levels of trust than those interviewed later.

cational attainment. By contrast, variables on social capital and some of those on wealth assets are not relevant in structuring this axis.

By contrast, Axis 2 is very clearly defined by indicators on social capital. Almost 70% of the contributions stem from four variables; trust in people of other race groups, same race, in others and in relatives. The only other variables affecting this axis are derived from cultural capital: the respondent's own education, and English proficiency.

It is striking and important that most of our active variables contribute to the first two axes. Axis 3 is clearly an even more distinct social capital trust-axis than Axis 2 with 86% of the contribution stemming from three variables on trust, which largely amplify the differentiation already evident on Axis 2. Additionally, given that there is a clear drop in the eigenvalues from Axis 2 to Axis 3, and that the third axis sums up 9.2%, we interpret this axis as a secondary axis. Axis 4 receives more balanced contributions from the whole set of variables and is therefore also more of a general axis. Further inspection of the cloud of individuals shows that there is a strong Guttman effect in plane 1-4. Therefore, both Axes 3 and 4 are dropped and we concentrate on the first two axes for further, detailed interpretation.

Table 2: Contributions from active variables

Variables	Relative Weight (%)	Axis 1	Axis 2	Axis 3	Axis 4	Axis 5
Income quintile	7.1	14.7	1.6	0.9	5.1	8.6
Property	6.6	2.4	1.4	0.1	12.5	22.5
Net worth	7	2.4	0	0.1	3.8	21.4
Financial assets	7.1	12.1	4.4	1.1	8.9	2.1
Own a computer	7.1	11.5	0.2	0.1	4.8	0.2
Rooms	7.1	1.5	1.5	0.2	4.5	10.2
Mother's education [M_Educ]	6.6	10.6	4.1	1.7	11.6	4.7
Individual education [IndEduc]	7.1	14.4	8.4	2.3	18.7	11.9
Proficiency writing in English [W_Eng]	7.1	11.2	8.8	2.8	9	12.9
Trust others of the same race (recoded) [Tr_OthRace]	7.1	5.5	22.1	33.9	5.6	1.2
Trust other races (recoded) [Tr_Race]	7.1	5.5	17.4	30.4	4.4	0.9
Trust relatives (recoded) [Tr_REL]	7.1	2	9	2.5	4	2.6
Trust others	7.1	4.8	19.9	23.1	5.5	0.5
A neighbour would return a dropped wallet	6.9	1.4	1.3	0.6	1.6	0.4
Total	98	100	100	100	100	100

Figure 5 shows the cloud of individuals in factorial plane 1 and 2 and reveals a striking and important contrast with European nations. As discussed above, it is common for the differentiation on the second axis to be much stronger at the top of the capital distribution, reflecting social capital splits within the middle and upper classes between those with relatively high amounts of either cultural or economic capital. In South Africa, by contrast, there is rather little differentiation at the top of the capital distribution, but much more at the bottom of the distribution. This can largely be explained by the fact that economic and cultural capital are highly aligned in South Africa whereas social capital is more differentiated, and indeed differentiated at the bottom of the social

structure.

The very important implication is that privileged South Africans are relatively uniform and cohesive and stand in opposition to a more fractured and differentiated group of disadvantaged South Africans. This could also be linked to the entrenched racial divides that we have considered, and notably the possibility that it is White South Africans who continue to occupy privileged positions. Our further analyses will allow us to probe precisely these issues.

Figure 6 examines the cloud of categories which contribute to both axes. As expected, this first axis clearly describes a hierarchy between high and low volumes of cultural and economic capital, with indicators of the highest volume located in the lower left quadrant, compared to indicators of low volumes, especially of cultural capital, found in the upper right quadrant, and further removed from the barycenter along Axis 2. This is clear visual confirmation of the very strong intersection between economic and cultural capital in South Africa, which seems to be stronger than for European nations. An interesting finding is that amongst the economic capital variables, the most powerful are those for income, financial assets, and computer ownership, whereas variables concerning property ownership, net worth, and size of house are much less important.

Axis 1 is therefore a capital volume axis. Figure 6 also shows that Axis 2 describes an opposition between respondents with very low levels of trust (at the bottom) compared with respondents with high levels of trust in others at the top. This opposition is stark: all categories indicating the lowest trust levels – "Not at all" and "Just a little/ Not at all", are located in the lower right quadrant. It is striking that those with higher amounts of trust also tend to have lower levels of personal and maternal educational capital, so there is not the overlap between educational attainment and social capital that one might expect to find in European nations.

Figure. 5: Cloud of individuals, factorial plane 1-2.



Figure 6: Cloud of Categories. Indicators on Economic & Cultural Capital, Factorial Plane 1-2



We underscore the distinctiveness of these findings. Taken together, and unlike what has been found in analyses of data from European societies, we find a capital composition principle at work at the *bottom* of the social space; those with low volumes of economic and cultural capital are differentiated between those with higher and lower volumes of social capital.

We can interpret these findings by superimposing supplementary variables on race/ethnicity, age groups, urban-rural, religious denomination, and importance of religion to see how far these are associated with the location of our active variables. Here we follow the principles described in Le Roux & Rouanet (2010), in which deviation between two categories >0.5 standard deviation (SD) is described as notable and a deviation >1.0 SD as large.

Figure 7 shows with exceptional clarity that the first capital composition axis is linked to racial group. White respondents are located on the left hand of this axis, amongst respondents with high amounts of economic and cultural capital. Black and Coloured respondents are located on the right-hand side. Along Axis 1, the deviation between the White race and all the other race categories is 0.8 SD or more. The deviation between White and Black or Coloured is >1.8 (very large deviations). The deviation Asian/Indian and Black or Coloured is also >0.7 (a notable deviation). The capital volume axis is thus also describing a hierarchy in terms of racial inequality.

Figure 7 shows that whereas Axis 1 describes an opposition between different race groups, Axis 2 is based on age, separating between the youngest and the oldest respondents. The significance of age is often found in European studies, though is more commonly associated with differing kinds of cultural capital, whereas in South Africa these differences are driven by social capital. There is a perfect rank order along Axis 2 and the

deviation is >0.8. The lowest trust levels are more often found among the youngest respondents and the highest trust levels among the more elderly respondents (70 yrs+).

Figure 7: Race and Age supplementary variables– Factorial plane 1-2



Further analysis along Axis 2 reveals a geo-spatial opposition (see Figure A1 in Appendix A), albeit not the strongest (the distance between the two mean category points, Farms – Urban, is close to 0.5). This may be associated with the propensity of younger Black South Africans to move to more urban areas i.e. be associated with age, or reflect that the social fabric in urban areas is more fragile than that in farming areas. Along Axis 1, the opposition between Traditional – Urban is >0.55. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, gender differences are rather small. Finally, the importance of religion is not a cleaving dimension (see Figure A2 in Appendix A).

In summary, South African social space is deeply divided, with economic and cultural capital being similarly arrayed hierarchically, and with very little separation between them, unlike the situation that Bourdieu diagnosed in France. This is associated with stark racial divisions, in which White South Africans dominate the possession of both economic and cultural capital. That said, there is a significant, secondary differentiation between those with higher and lower amounts of social capital, which does not appear to be associated with racial divisions, or economic and social capital, but is linked to age differences (Figure 7). To complete our analysis, we now turn to report a cluster analysis which permits us to draw out the wider implications of our findings.

5. Clustering social space in South Africa

In order to identify subgroups or clusters within this space, we perform mixed, hierarchical clustering which generates a five-cluster solution. Figure 8 illustrates the distribution of these five clusters, which are highly distinctive. On the privileged, left-hand side of the social space, we find a pink and a black cluster, which hardly overlap with the blue and red clusters of disadvantage. It is unusual to find such crisp clusters: only the large central cluster (orange) cuts across all the others.

Figure 8: Clustering South African Social Space



In the interpretation of the clusters, we follow the principles in Denord et al. (2011). To identify the characteristics of each cluster, we examine categories that are over- or under-represented i.e., where the difference in the percentage of the category in the cluster versus the sample is >5%[13] (note, that if the relative frequency in the sample is <5%, the percentage in the cluster should be >2 times the frequency in the sample to be classified as over- or under-represented).

The largest, orange cluster, with 46.2% is composed of respondents in the centre of the social space. It is to be interpreted as a general cluster, containing similar distributions on the active variables as found in the full sample, and thus might be taken to represent the 'average South African' (Tables B2.1 & B2.2). This group is characterized by an overrepresentation of categories that signify little capital of all forms. Overrepresented categories include respondents with incomplete secondary education, along with respondents not in owner occupied property, living in small

13 The p-value should usually also be <.05, but due to weighting, this does not apply here.

properties, and among whom self-reported trust is low. The only supplementary modalities over-represented are categories for Black respondents (89% of those in this cluster, compared to 81% of the adult population), and younger (age 24-39) South Africans.

If this large cluster represents the baseline, there are two distinctive clusters on either side, two of which represent forms of relative privilege, the other two drawing out relative disadvantage. These are of more direct sociological interest given the aims of our paper. Most importantly, there is a distinctive 'inheritor' cluster (Table B3.1 & B3.2). This only comprises 7% of respondents, who are defined by being disproportionately well educated (69% have a post-school qualification compared to 29% of the sample as a whole) and more importantly for this to be inherited from their mothers (nearly 100% of their mothers have post-school qualifications, compared to 7% of the sample as a whole). They are disproportionately well off in income terms (65% are in the top quintile of earners, compared to 27% of the sample), and have extensive assets, with 62% reporting above the median value of financial assets (compared to 36% of the sample).

Unsurprisingly, this inheritor cluster is massively disproportionately white, in gainful employment, young, living in urban areas, and is more likely to report relatively high levels of trust. They are slightly more likely to be male. Nonetheless, it is worth reflecting on the fact that although this cluster is disproportionately white, because the White population of South Africa is small, at 8%, this still means that 60% of the respondents in this cluster are from other race groups. In short, we should be mindful that the inheritor class cannot simply be conflated with rich White South Africans.

It is the other privileged cluster, which we term the upwardly mobile, that is perhaps of even more sociological interest (Tables B4.1 & B4.2). This is a large cluster comprising 24% of the total sample. It consists of highly educated respondents, who characteristically have mothers with only intermediate educational qualifications. In this respect, the cluster is associated with the dramatic rise of educational attainment in South African society overall. The respondents also have high volumes of economic capital with 56% being in the top income quintile (compared to 27% overall), and they have disproportionate amounts of financial assets (61% report above median financial assets) and their trust levels towards others are high.

It is telling that White respondents are again disproportionately found in this upwardly mobile cluster (with 22% of the cluster being composed of them). It follows that White respondents have been disproportionately able to take advantage of prospects of upward mobility facilitated by educational expansion. However, it is striking that Asian and Indian respondents are also strongly overrepresented amongst its ranks (comprising 5% of this cluster, compared to 2% overall).

Interestingly, the racial composition of the two privileged clusters is similar (57%, 29%, 6.4% and 1.4% in the inheritor cluster and 58%, 23%, 6.6%, and 4.6% in the upwardly mobile cluster for African, White, Coloured and Indian/Asian respectively). What distinguishes these clusters more distinctively in the supplementary variables space, is the age and sex composition. The inheritor group has an overrepresentation of young (under 40) and male respondents relative to the upwardly mobile group. This suggests that individuals in the inheritor group, particularly male individuals,

experience prosperity at a younger age, bringing to the fore the transmission of intergenerational advantage within this group.

In short, these two privileged clusters suggest more mobility and dynamism amongst the top levels of South African society than might be expected from the aggregate data that we reviewed at the start of this paper. In particular, and partly reflecting the small size of the White population, we should not infer from the disproportionate shares of White respondents in these two clusters that there is a simple categorical racial divide in operation. More particularly, there is significant evidence of upward mobility amongst Asian/Indian respondents, 51% of whom are in this cluster. It is nonetheless remarkable to underscore that even in post-apartheid times, 91% of White South Africans are in either the inheritor or upwardly mobile clusters.

Let us now turn to reflect on the two clusters of relative – and extreme – disadvantage. The most striking of these is an excluded cluster consisting of respondents with no schooling. Interestingly, all respondents in the sample with no schooling (6%) are located in this cluster (Tables B5.1 & B5.2). This cluster also contains disproportionate numbers who have mothers with no schooling, (92% compared to 36% overall), who have no financial assets (74% compared to 30%), and low earnings. Although there are also a disproportionate number living in large houses with 7+ rooms, one should keep in mind that this is most likely a heterogenous category, describing both expensive mansions and inexpensive houses where several generations might be under the same roof. This cluster is disproportionately Black (91%), not economically active, female, rural and relatively elderly.

The other disadvantaged cluster, which we call the precarious, is larger (17% of the sample) and strongly overrepresented by those with only primary schooling, low English proficiency and smaller houses (Table B6.1 & B6.2). Black respondents, those not economically active and respondents aged 50 and above are overrepresented.

It seems clear in reflecting on these five clusters that the two privileged inheritor and upwardly mobile clusters diverge more from the characteristics of the general cluster than the precarious and excluded. By contrast, the excluded and precarious largely amplify the economic and cultural capital characteristics of the large general cluster. This allows a useful heuristic way of categorising social inequality in South Africa according to the stocks of capital measured here. Roughly two thirds have little or no capital. Roughly one third can be characterised as possessing significant capital stocks, and this group can be differentiated between a smaller inheritor class and a larger group of the upwardly mobile.

6. Conclusions

The analysis we present here is the first attempt to systematically map how stocks of economic, cultural, and social capital intersect to generate systematic and structural inequalities in South Africa, and to consider how far these are associated with fundamental racial divides. Given extreme levels of economic inequality found in South Africa, this attempt to map out the broader sociological patterns is of considerable significance. We have argued that privilege and wealth cannot simply be seen as an elite phenomenon and is much more embedded in the upper reach-

es of South African society, hence requiring systematic sociological investigation.

We can reflect on four striking features of the South African social space. Firstly, there is clear evidence of the intensely strong interplay between inequalities of economic and cultural capital. In contrast to conventional studies of European and other global north nations, we see little evidence for much fragmentation between 'intellectuals' and 'industrialists' (to use Bourdieu's framing), or between the 'Brahmin left' and 'merchant right' (to adopt Piketty's terminology). Those with high levels of economic capital tend also to have high levels of cultural capital, and vice versa. By contrast, social capital turns out to be a divisive force in South Africa. Whereas Bourdieu saw social capital as much less significant than economic and cultural capital, in South Africa, which is characterised by generally low levels of trust, it is strongly differentiated on the second axis.

Secondly, there is some evidence that this homogeneity is associated with an enduring racialized divide, since White South Africans are disproportionately located amongst those with the highest capital stocks – of both economic and cultural capital. Thirdly, however, our cluster analysis reveals that it is unhelpful to assume that there is a simple reproduction of social inequality. We are struck by the size of the cluster of upwardly mobile South Africans, where levels of education appear to be rising inter-generationally, and the broad finding that one third of respondents wield significant capital stocks indicates that forms of middle-class privilege percolate well beyond a core of the 8% of the White population. These dynamic tendencies are a significant feature of South African society and need to be recognized.

Finally, social capital is strongly delineated by age, with older respondents displaying on average higher levels of trust. However, our cluster analysis reveals an added complexity to this relationship. The privileged and the excluded clusters display higher levels of trust than the general cluster, a cluster in which almost two thirds of younger people are found. While the distinction between the excluded and general cluster trust levels align with older groups being more likely to live in rural areas and report higher levels of trust, compared to younger Black South Africans who report much less trust and are more likely to be urban dwellers, the more distinct division between trust levels among the privileged and general cluster is not a function of location or age. Insofar as the low levels of trust in the general cluster may limit the social resources that younger age groups may draw on, it might follow that this could entrench social and racial divisions more strongly.

To conclude, we have been able to provide a much fuller sociological analysis of the organization of privilege and resources in South Africa than has been previously possible. Whilst confirming how entrenched racial inequalities remain, we have also found important suggestions of fluidity and change, which mean that there is no simple reproduction of older forms of inequality. This charge of a model of society oriented around the mechanical reproduction of privilege is sometimes leveled against Bourdieu's sociological perspective – and it is therefore of considerable interest that we have been able to apply this broad approach to reveal more subtle changes.

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APPENDIX A

Table A1: Mean of supplementary variables by race

	All	African	Coloured	Indian/Asian	White
Share of respondents	1.00	0.80	0.09	0.02	0.08
	0.54	0.54	0.57	0.54	0.55
Age 24-29	0.21	0.23	0.18	0.18	0.11
Age 30-39	0.27	0.29	0.23	0.23	0.15
Age 40-49	0.18	0.17	0.19	0.19	0.18
Age 50-59	0.13	0.12	0.16	0.17	0.17
Age 60-69	0.08	0.07	0.07	0.09	0.16
Age 70-79	0.04	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.10
Age 80-85	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.03
Traditional	0.28	0.35	0.01	0.01	0.00
Urban	0.67	0.61	0.92	0.88	0.97
Farms	0.04	0.04	0.07	0.11	0.03
Missing	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.02
No religion	0.11	0.11	0.13	0.08	0.08
Christian	0.79	0.79	0.80	0.26	0.88
Jewish/Muslim/Hindu/Other	0.03	0.01	0.06	0.66	0.02
African traditional spiritual beliefs	0.06	0.08	0.01	0.00	0.00
Missing	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.02
Unimportant	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.10	0.15
Important	0.41	0.44	0.34	0.21	0.31
Very important	0.47	0.44	0.54	0.68	0.52
Not economically active	0.32	0.31	0.35	0.43	0.36
Unemployed/Discouraged	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.01
Unemployed/Strict	0.11	0.12	0.08	0.03	0.04
Employed	0.56	0.55	0.56	0.51	0.59
No superannuation assets	0.90	0.92	0.87	0.92	0.69
Has private superannuation assets	0.09	0.07	0.12	0.07	0.30
Missing	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.00	0.01
Observations3	17359	13543	2431	316	1067

Note: Data are weighted using post-stratification weights.
Sample is restricted to adults aged 24-85 (proxy respondents excluded).

Table A2: Eigenvalues, % explained variance and modified rates, axes 1-5

Axis	Variance (eigenvalues)	% explained variance	Cumulative expl. variance	Benzecri's modified rates
1	0,243	9,7	9,7	51,9
2	0,173	6,9	16,5	20,5
3	0,133	5,3	21,8	9,2
4	0,122	4,9	26,7	7,0
5	0.089	3,6	30,2	1,9

Table A3: Contributions from active categories to Axis 1. Categories with contributions >2.0%

Negative coordinates	Positive coordinates
Own a computer – Yes: 9.7%	Write in English – Not well/Not at all: 6.2%
Income – Quintile 5: 9.3%	Financial assets – None: 5.9%
Own educ – Post-School qual.: 6.2%	Own educ – Primary: 3.7%
Financial Assets – >Median: 6.1%	Mother's educ – No schooling: 3.7%
Write English – Very Well: 4.4%	Income – Quintile 1: 2.4%
Trust same race – Somewhat/A lot: 3.4%	Own Educ – No schooling: 2.3%
Trust other race – Somewhat/A lot: 3.4%	Trust other race – Not at all: 2.1%
Mother's educ – Post-school qual.: 3.2%	
Mother's educ – Matric (grade 12): 2.7%	
Trust others – A lot: 2.1%	
Total, both sides: 76.9%	

Table A4: Contributions from active categories to Axis 2. Categories with contributions >2.0%

Negative coordinates	Positive coordinates
Trust same race – Not at all: 14.2%	Trust same race – Somewhat/A lot: 6.9%
Trust others – Not at all: 13.1%	Write in English – Not well at all: 6.2%
Trust other race – Not at all: 9.6%	Trust other race – Somewhat/A lot: 6.1%
Trust relatives – Not at all/A little: 6.1%	Trust others – Somewhat: 4.6%
Write in English – Very well: 2.5%	Own educ – Primary: 3.4%
	Own educ – No schooling: 3.1%
	Financial assets – None: 3.0%
	Mother's educ – No schooling: 2.4%
	Trust others – A lot: 2.2%
	Trust relatives – A lot: 2.7%
	Total, both sides: 86.1%

Figure A1: Geo location and Sex supplementary variables–Factorial plane 1-2



Figure A2: Religion as a supplementary variable–Factorial plane 1-2



APPENDIX B

Table B1: Five-cluster solution

Category	Count	Weight	Percentage
Cluster 1/5	1581	1472688,396	5,5
Cluster 2/5	4023	4591590,603	17,1
Cluster 3/5	7176	12386844,499	46,2
Cluster 4/5	3703	6491460,124	24,2
Cluster 5/5	848	1879497,300	7,0
Overall	**17331**	**26822080,923**	**100,0**

Table B2.1: Interpretation of the general cluster. 46.2% of the sample. Overrepresented, active categories

Variable	Category	Category % in cluster	Category % in adult population	% of category in cluster
		A	B	46,2*A/B
Income	Quintile 4	28,9	23,2	57,6
Property	Not living in own property	68,2	59,1	53,3
Financial assets	Financial assets <= median value	45,1	33,9	61,5
Own a computer	No	93	83,6	51,4
Rooms	1-2 rooms	34,5	27,6	57,8
Individual education	Incomplete secondary	51,9	34	70,5
Mother's education	Primary	32,5	22,9	65,6
Proficiency writing in English	Very well	62,7	55,8	51,9
Proficiency writing in English	Fair	29,4	20,6	66
Trust others of the same race	Not at all	45,7	29,8	70,8
Trust others of the same race	Just a little	47	40,6	53,5
Trust other races	Not at all	57,7	40,9	65,1
Trust others you know	Not at all	31,5	20	72,8
Trust others you know	Just a little	47,9	39	56,7
Trust relatives	Not/A Little	40,5	29,2	64,1
A neighbour would return a dropped wallet	Not likely at all	68,7	61,3	51,8

Table B2.2: Interpretation of the general cluster. 46.2% of the sample. Overrepresented, supplementary categories

Variable	Category	Category % in cluster	Category % in adult population	% of category in cluster
Race	African	89,3	80,5	51,2
Age group	24-29 years	28,0	21,1	61,3
Age group	30-39 years	38,0	30,9	56,9

Table B3.1: Interpretation of the inheritors. 7% of the sample. Overrepresented, active categories

Variable	Category	Category % in cluster	Category % in adult population	% of category in cluster
Income	Quintile 5	64,6	26,5	17,1
Net worth	Something left over	54,1	44,1	8,6
Financial assets	Financial assets > median value	61,6	35,6	12,1
Property	Not living in own property	68,9	59,1	8,2
Own a computer	Yes	51,4	16,3	22,1
Rooms	7+ rooms	27,8	16,5	11,8
Individual education	Matric (grade 12)	17,9	17,4	7,2
Individual education	Post-school qualification	68,9	28,5	16,9
Mother's education	Post-school qualification	99,7	7,2	96,7
Proficiency writing in English	Very well	89,1	55,8	11,2
Trust others of the same race	Somewhat/A lot	36,3	29,2	8,7
Trust other races	Somewhat/A lot	33,0	23,7	9,7
Trust relatives	I trust them a lot	52,7	45,7	8,1
Trust others you know	I trust them somewhat	38,7	31,5	8,6

Table B3.2: Interpretation of the inheritors. 7% of the sample. Overrepresented, supplementary categories

Variable	Category	Category % in cluster	Category % in adult population	% of category in cluster
Race	White	29,2	8,3	24,7
Employment status	Employed	73,1	55,5	9,2
Sex	Male	53,1	46,1	8,1
Pension	Has private superannuation assets	24,6	9,4	18,2
Religion	Christian	86,7	78,8	7,7
Location	Urban	82,5	67,2	8,6
Age group	20-29 years	35,3	21,1	11,7
Age group	30-39 years	37,3	30,9	8,5

Table B4.1: Interpretation of the upwardly mobile. 24.2% of the sample. Overrepresented, active categories

Variable	Category	Category % in cluster	Category % in adult population	% of category in cluster
Income	Quintile 5	55,9	26,5	51,0
Property	Owner occupied	36,2	25,3	34,6
Net worth	Something left over	57,3	44,1	31,5
Financial assets	Financial assets > median value	60,7	35,6	41,3
Own a computer	Yes	38,3	16,3	56,9
Rooms	5-6 rooms	30,6	24,2	30,7
Rooms	7+ rooms	23,0	16,5	33,8
Individual education	Matric (grade 12)	26,0	17,4	36,2
Individual education	Post-school qualification	47,5	28,5	40,3
Mother's education	Incomplete secondary	32,1	20,0	38,8
Mother's education	Matric (grade 12)	19,2	6,2	74,5
Proficiency writing in English	Very well	80,6	55,8	35,0
Trust others of the same race	Somewhat/A lot	70,7	29,2	58,6
Trust other races	Somewhat/A lot	58,9	23,7	60,2
Trust relatives	I trust them a lot	64,6	45,7	34,2
Trust others you know	I trust them somewhat	53,0	31,5	40,7
Trust others you know	I trust them a lot	23,1	9,4	59,6
A neighbour would return a dropped wallet	Very likely	19,8	13,1	36,5

Table B4.2: Interpretation of the upwardly mobile. 24.2% of the sample. Overrepresented, supplementary categories

Variable	Category	Category % in cluster	Category % in adult population	% of category in cluster
Race	Asian/Indian	4,6	2,2	51,0
Race	White	22,7	8,3	66,4
Employment status	Employed	68,1	55,5	29,7
Pension	Has private superannuation assets	20,6	9,4	52,9
Religion	Very important	53,2	46,5	27,7
Religion	Christian	83,7	78,8	25,7
Location	Urban	78,3	67,2	28,2

Table B5.1: Interpretation of the excluded. 5.5% of the sample. Overrepresented active categories

Variable	Category	Category % in cluster	Category % in adult population	% of category in cluster
Income	Quintile 1	25,9	14,1	10,1
Income	Quintile 2	27,4	16,9	8,9
Income	Quintile 3	26,4	19,3	7,5
Property	Owner occupied, RDP (gov subsidy)	15,7	8,7	10,0
Property	Owner occupied, value missing	20,9	6,9	16,5
Net worth	In debt/don't know	39,0	26,8	8,0
Financial assets	None	74,0	29,6	13,7
Own a computer	No	99,3	83,6	6,5
Rooms	7+ rooms	22,2	16,5	7,4
Individual education	No schooling	100,0	5,5	100,0
Mother's education	No schooling	91,7	36,4	13,8
Proficiency writing in English	Not well/not at all	96,8	23,6	22,5
Trust others of the same race	Just a little	46,8	40,6	6,3

Table B5.2: Interpretation of the excluded. 5.5% of the sample. Overrepresented, supplementary categories

Variable	Category	Category % in cluster	Category % in adult population	% of category in cluster
Race	African	90,8	80,5	6,2
Employment status	Not economically active	72,5	32,4	12,3
Sex	Female	66,7	53,9	6,8
Pension	No superannuation assets	98,0	89,7	6,0
Religion	African traditional spiritual beliefs	12,1	6,5	10,3
Location	Traditional	61,5	28,5	11,9
Age group	50-59 years	22,1	14,2	8,5
Age group	60-69 years	29,7	9,0	18,1
Age group	70-79 years	23,9	4,2	31,2

Table B6.1: Interpretation of the precariat. 17.1% of the sample. Overrepresented, active categories

Variable	Category	% of category in cluster	% of category in sample	% of cluster in category
Income	Quintile 1	27.9	14.1	34
Income	Quintile 2	27.4	16.9	27.8
Income	Quintile 3	25.2	19.3	22.3
Financial assets	None	66.4	29.6	38.4
Property	Owner occupied, RDP (gov subsidy)	16.7	8.7	33.1
Property	Owner occupied, value missing	12.5	6.9	30.8
Own a computer	No	98.6	83.6	20.2
Rooms	3-4 rooms	37.1	31.7	20
Individual education	Primary	78.5	14	96.1
Mother's education	No schooling	71.7	36.4	33.7
Proficiency writing in English	Not well/not at all	77.7	23.6	56.3
Trust other races	Just a little	39.2	34.7	19.3
Trust others of the same race	Just a little	45.8	40.6	19.3

Table B6.2: Interpretation of the precariat. 17.1% of the sample. Overrepresented, supplementary categories

Variable	Category	Category % in cluster	Category % in adult population	% of category in cluster
Race	African	86,7	80,5	18,4
Employment status	Not economically active	53,7	32,4	28,4
Pension	No superannuation assets	97,9	89,7	18,7
Location	Traditional	44,3	28,5	26,7
Age group	50-59 years	27,7	14,2	33,3
Age group	60-69 years	19,9	9,0	37,8

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